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A FORMULA GOES TO COURT:
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING AND THE EFFICIENCY GAP
MIRA BERNSTEIN AND MOON DUCHIN
Abstract. Recently, a proposal has been advanced to detect unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering
with a simple formula called the efficiency gap. The efficiency gap is now working its way towards a possible
landmark case in the Supreme Court. This note explores some of its mathematical properties in light of
the fact that it reduces to a straight proportional comparison of votes to seats. Though we offer several
critiques, we assess that EG can still be a useful component of a courtroom analysis. But a famous formula
can take on a life of its own and this one will need to be watched closely.
Gerrymandering is drawing political boundary lines with an ulterior motive. This idea has great cur-
rency right now, with particular attention paid to manipulating shapes of U.S. congressional and legislative
districts in order to obtain a preferred outcome. Gerrymandering comes in many flavors, including racial
gerrymandering, where a minority group is subject to dilution of its voting strength; partisan gerrymander-
ing, where one political party controls the process and tries to exaggerate its own political dominance; and
incumbent gerrymandering, where officials try to create safe seats for incumbents on both sides of the aisle.
All kinds of gerrymandering use some of the same techniques, especially packing, where you seek to stuff
your opponents into districts with very high percentages, and cracking, where you disperse your opponents
into several districts in numbers too small to predominate. Both of these techniques generate wasted votes
by your opponents and thus reduce your opponents’ share of seats relative to their share of the votes cast.
In this note we will focus on partisan gerrymandering. The Supreme Court has heard cases on partisan
gerrymandering three times,1 and each time the justices have balked. They disagreed among themselves
about whether partisan gerrymandering was within the Court’s purview at all and about what standards
might be used to detect it. In the most recent case, the swing vote belonged to Justice Anthony Kennedy,
who wrote a lengthy opinion explaining why he was unsatisfied with the standards proposed by the plaintiffs
to demonstrate that unconstitutional gerrymandering had occurred. Kennedy also gave some guidelines for
what would be needed to satisfy him in the future. For the past 10 years, legal scholars and political scientists
have pored over Kennedy’s opinion, trying to design a standard that he might find convincing.
In 2015, one such team, Nicholas Stephanopoulos and Eric McGhee, advanced a new idea to quantify
partisan gerrymandering, tailored to Kennedy’s guidelines [3]. They propose a simple numerical score called
the efficiency gap (EG) to detect and reject unfair congressional and legislative maps that are rigged to keep
one party on top in a way that is unresponsive to voter preferences. EG can be computed based on voting
data from a single election: if the result exceeds a certain threshold, then the districting plan has been found
to have discriminatory partisan effect.
Last November, for the first time in 30 years, a federal court invalidated a legislative map as an unconsti-
tutional partisan gerrymander [4].2 A centerpiece in the district court’s ruling was the high efficiency gap in
Wiconsin’s 2012–2016 elections in favor of Republicans. Now the case is under appeal to the Supreme Court,
and many observers are hoping that EG will finally provide a legally manageable standard for detecting
partisan gerrymanders in time for the 2020 census. If this happens, it will signal a seismic shift in American
politics.
In this note, we engage in the following exercise: first, we give a self-contained analysis for a mathematical
audience, describing what it measures and what it does not. Then, we examine how our findings relate to
the original proposal, the press coverage, and the court decisions to date. We close by looking to the future
career of this consequential formula.
Mira Bernstein (mira.bernstein@tufts.edu) is a research assistant professor in Science, Technology, and Society at Tufts
University. Moon Duchin (moon.duchin@tufts.edu) is an associate professor of Mathematics at Tufts University.
1Davis v. Bandemer (1986); Vieth v. Jubelirer (2004); LULAC v. Perry (2006)
2This happened only once before, in Davis v. Bandemer (1982), which was later overturned by the Supreme Court.
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1. What is the efficiency gap?
The U.S. electoral scene is dominated by the use of geographically-defined districts in which one repre-
sentative is chosen by a plurality vote. We will follow the EG literature by simplifying to the case of only
two political parties, A and B. Let’s say that our state has S congressional or legislative seats, and denote
the set of districts by D = {d1, . . . , dS}. In a particular election, write D = D
A⊔DB where DP is the subset
of districts won by party P ∈ {A,B}. In what follows, if a value XPi is defined with respect to party P and
district di, we will write
XP =
S∑
i=1
XPi ; Xi = X
A
i +X
B
i ; and X = X
A +XB =
S∑
i=1
Xi.
Let SPi be 1 if party P won in district di and 0 if not, so that S
P = |DP | is the number of seats won
statewide by P . Let TPi be the number of votes cast in district di for party P , so that Ti is the voting
turnout in district di and T
A is the total number of statewide votes for A. Later we’ll make the further
simplifying assumption that the districts have not just equal population but equal turnout: Ti = T/S.
With this notation, we can write τ = T
A
−TB
T and σ =
SA−SB
S for the statewide vote lean favoring A and
the statewide seat lean favoring A. Most people’s intuitions about fairness would incline towards a districting
plan that approximates proportionality, or σ ≈ τ . Historically, the courts have sometimes recognized rough
proportionality as a virtue, but have explicitly rejected strict proportionality as a standard.3
Wasted votes, in the EG formulation, are any votes cast for the losing side or votes cast for the winning
side in excess of the 50% needed to win. That is, the number of votes wasted by A-voters in district di is
WAi =
{
TAi −
Ti
2 , di ∈ D
A,
TAi , di ∈ D
B
= TAi − S
A
i ·
Ti
2
Quick observation: the total number of wasted votes in a district, Wi =W
A
i +W
B
i , is always half of the
turnout Ti. The question is how the wasted votes are distributed. If (nearly) all the wasted votes belong
to the winning side, it’s a packed district. If (nearly) all the wasted votes belong to the losing side, it’s a
competitive district. And if there are several adjacent districts where most of the wasted votes are on the
losing side, then it may be a cracked plan.
We can now define the efficiency gap associated with districting plan D:
EG =
S∑
i=1
WAi −W
B
i
T
=
WA −WB
T
.
Thus EG is a signed measure of how much more vote share is wasted by supporters of party A than B. If
EG is large and positive, the districting plan is deemed unfair to A. On the other hand, EG ≈ 0 indicates
a fair plan, inasmuch as the two parties waste about an equal number of votes. Stephanopoulos–McGhee
write that this definition “captures, in a single tidy number, all of the packing and cracking decisions that
go into a district plan.”
For a toy example, consider the figure below, which shows three possible districting plans for the same
distribution of voters. Each box represents a voter; A-voters are marked ⋆ and B-voters are blank. Since
A-voters make up half of the population, intuitively we expect a “fair” plan to have SA = SB. Plans I and
III both do this and it is easy to check that they have EG = 0. In contrast, Plan II gives A five of the
six seats by packing some B-voters into one district and cracking the rest. This gerrymander is successfully
detected: EG = −1/3, unfairly favoring Party A. Note that there is a lot of packing and cracking in Plan
III as well, but this is not penalized by EG because it happens symmetrically to voters of both parties.
3The Supreme Court has a complicated attitude to proportionality. See, for instance, Gaffney v. Cummings (1973), Davis
v. Bandemer (1986), and Johnson v. De Grandy (1994). However, it was clearly stated in the Bandemer plurality opinion that
“the mere lack of proportional representation will not be sufficient to prove unconstitutional discrimination.”
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Plan III: EG = 0
Of course, in real life, no districting plan will have an efficiency gap of exactly 0. How high is too high?
In [3], the authors argue that EG = .08 corresponds to a historically robust threshold for unacceptable
partisan gerrymandering.4 In the Wisconsin case, for example, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the last
three elections for the state assembly had efficiency gaps between 0.1 and 0.13 in favor of Republicans. Since
it was a Republican legislature that had drawn the map, and there was plentiful evidence that they had
intentionally done so to disfavor Democrats, the court ruled that the plan was an unconstitutional partisan
gerrymander. QED.
2. What does the efficiency gap actually measure?
But wait! The EG formula turns out to simplify quite a bit, in a way that has bearing on our understanding
of what it measures. Let’s proceed with the assumption of equal voter turnout: Ti = T/S.
5 In this case, we
get
WA =
∑
WAi = T
A − SA ·
T
2S
,
and thus
EG =
TA − TB
T
−
1
2
SA − SB
S
= τ −
1
2
σ.
That is: the efficiency gap is just the statewide vote lean favoring A minus half of the statewide seat lean
favoring A.6 It has nothing at all to do with how the voters are distributed among districts, per se. As
long as the seat total comes out a certain way, as in Plan III shown above, EG does not penalize packing or
cracking, or for that matter bizarrely-shaped districts—and indeed, it sometimes incentivizes them, as we
will see below.
In its simplified form (τ − 12σ), we can see that EG has numerous potentially undesirable properties.
• Penalizes proportionality. If Party A has 60% of the statewide vote and 60% of the seats, EG
rates this as an unacceptable gerrymander in favor of Party B! (τ − σ2 = 0.2− 0.1 > 0.08.) This is
because EG = 0 ⇐⇒ σ = 2τ . That is, the intuitive idea that representation should be proportional
to vote share is replaced by the conflicting principle that the seat lean should be twice the vote lean.
• Volatile in competitive races. EG behaves very erratically if there are districts with competitive
races, because a genuinely close outcome will produce lopsided vote wastage, but it is unpredictable
4They propose a somewhat different standard of two excess seats for congressional districting plans.[3]
5Dropping the equal-turnout assumption only makes matters worse in the critiques of EG that follow, because this corre-
sponds to a weighting of terms that is harder to interpret and defend. Without the equal-turnout simplification, EG is affected
as follows: if there is lower average turnout in the districts DA, then maintaining a low EG requires A to get more seats than
party B would have with the same vote share.
6This can also be written in terms of seat share and vote share rather than seat lean and vote lean:
EG = 2(TA/T ) − (SA/S)− 1/2.
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which side this falls on.7 If, for instance, all districts are competitive but a last-minute trend pushes
voters to one side systematically, then the plan itself will be rated as a gerrymander.
• Fetishizes three-to-one landslide districts. We’ve seen that EG is not sensitive to any changes
in packing and cracking that preserve σ (i.e., that preserve the overall seat outcome). But if anything,
EG rewards a certain level of district-by-district packing. Recall that every district has a total of
50% vote wastage. It immediately follows that the only way to share that fairly in a single district
is to have 25% on each side, which is a 75-25 vote split. So the only districts viewed by EG to
be perfectly neutral are highly non-competitive districts, and any plan made up entirely of these
landslide districts will be judged perfectly fair.
• Breaks down in edge cases. Despite the fact that 75% is an artificial sweet spot, 80% statewide
vote share breaks EG completely. If A controls more than 79% of the vote in a state, then τ >
.79− .21 = .58. In order to get τ −σ/2 < .08, we must have σ > 1, which is impossible. Thus, in this
circumstance EG will identify absolutely any districting plan as a partisan gerrymander in favor of
B.
• Nongranular. We have seen that EG does no more and no less than compare seats to votes by a
double-proportionality standard. This has the added consequence that in states with a small number
of districts, the way that EG depends on a districting plan is extremely nongranular: for a given
vote split, there are only S possible values of the the efficiency gap, as the majority party’s seat
total ranges from 1 to S. For a particular voting split, a small state may have no outcome at all
with a permissibly small EG. This makes the score far too coarse for use in many states; 21 states
currently have four or fewer Congressional districts.8
3. How is this playing out in court?
So far we have highlighted, with the help of simple algebra, several grave limitations of EG as a stand-
alone metric. If the Supreme Court were to enshrine the efficiency gap as a dispositive indicator of partisan
gerrymandering, it would be sure to produce false positives as well as false negatives with respect to any
common-sense understanding of political unfairness. But has anyone actually proposed that it be used that
way? The popular press has touted EG as “a formula to end gerrymandering”; a simple way to “end partisan
gerrymandering once and for all”; and trumpeted that “this is how to get rid of gerrymandered districts.”
But a brief review of the political science literature and court documents shows circumspect writing and
multifaceted analysis at all stages: the role of EG in the legal landscape is much more complex.
Original framing. First and importantly, Stephanopoulos and McGhee propose a doctrinal test for partisan
gerrymandering in which EG can be considered only if several other conditions are met. They address
concerns about volatility by requiring evidence of stability: plaintiffs must perform a “sensitivity analysis”
to show that their disadvantage would persist under a modest statewide swing to one party or the other and
must demonstrate the gap’s likely durability over time. Nongranularity is indirectly acknowledged: in their
historical analyses, the authors only considered elections with eight or more seats. And edge cases, in the
form of extremely lopsided elections, are simply dismissed as never occurring at the statewide level.
Defending the idealization of double-proportionality is a heavier lift. The fact that using EG commits you
to condemning proportional outcomes is actually observed in a footnote [3, p18 note 107], but the authors
defend it as reasonable on the grounds of quantifying an appropriate “seat bonus” for the majority party.
On this view, the efficiency gap quantifies the level of bonus that should be enjoyed by the winner: a party
with 60% of the vote should have 70% of the seats, a party with 70% of the vote should have 90% of the
seats, etc. We will return to this point below.
7In a current preprint, Cover argues persuasively that this provides a stark disincentive for even an honest mapmaker to
draw a competitive plan [2, p34].
8Cho discusses nongranularity at length in [1].
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The district court. Many objections to the usefulness of EG were introduced in the Wisconsin case in the
form of expert reports and testimony for the defense. The court decision endorses a three-pronged test9 ex-
panding on [3] by requiring proof of discriminatory intent, and the majority opinion argues that this protects
against false positives: “If a nonpartisan or bipartisan plan displays a high EG, the remaining components
of the analysis will prevent a finding of a constitutional violation.” Thus, for instance, a proportional plan
would not be thrown out on the grounds of high EG, because the plaintiffs would not be able to demon-
strate improper partisan intent. The court affirms EG not as a conclusive indicator, but only as persuasive
“corroborative evidence of an aggressive partisan gerrymander.”
The Supreme Court. The strategy that the Wisconsin plaintiffs will use at the next level is outlined in
their motion to appeal. While praising the usefulness and diminishing the critiques of EG, this document
does emphasize its limited role: “To be clear, Appellees do not ask the Court to endorse any particular
measure of partisan asymmetry or any particular technique for demonstrating durability. The [district
court] did not do so, nor need the [Supreme Court] in order to affirm. Rather, Appellees advocate the
same course of action the Court has followed in other redistricting contexts involving discriminatory effects:
namely, the articulation of a standard whose precise contours are filled in through subsequent litigation.”
And beyond. There is a philosophical issue at the heart of this analysis. Can a formula be said to “measure”
quantities that are used to compute it, or only those to which it is numerically sensitive? Wasted votes are
apparent inputs into EG, but their local contributions come out in the wash, and only deviation from
double-proportionality of seats to votes remains. Setting double-proportionality as a target contravenes the
common-sense preference for proportionality, an ideal that even the Supreme Court has recognized despite
its insistence that it is not constitutionally required. While political scientists have found evidence of a
hyper-proportional seat bonus in real elections, we have seen no persuasive case for the slippage from an
empirical description to a normative standard (that is, from what is the case to what should be the case).
We assess this as the most serious indictment of the EG formula.
Our evaluation suggests a suite of particular circumstances in which EG could be a useful component of a
broader analysis10—and it seems that Wisconsin is currently such a case. However, a mathematician could
well argue that a formula which is only used to lend numerical corroboration in special and extreme cases
is a formula of limited usefulness indeed. This caution has to be weighed against the plain fact that courts
have found no manageable standard to date for even the most extreme partisan abuses in redistricting.
To a great extent, critiques of EG are mitigated by the limited circumstances in which courts will apply it
and the fact that it may well be endorsed only as a first draft of a general standard that will be refined over
time. But major concerns remain. Courts will have safeguards in place, but EG is already in play outside
of courts, and there is a real risk that it may come to stand in as an operationalized definition of partisan
gerrymandering. We are seeing hints of this effect not only in the overheated popular press coverage but in
more scholarly work as well.11
Legal scholars believe that EG will appeal to the courts because of its simple, one-shot construction with
no technical machinery. As we have seen, the simplicity is actually illusory: a lot of care, including further
statistical testing and modeling, is required to use EG responsibly. Moreover, EG comes on the scene at
a time when having a single formula is becoming less important. One of the most promising directions in
the detection of gerrymandering is the use of supercomputing algorithms that can take multiple indicators
into account simultaneously. For instance, various teams of researchers have developed simulation tools
for comparing a proposed plan against an algorithmically generated batch of alternate plans.12 Typically
these simulations can incorporate both equality constraints and inequality constraints, encoding both legal
9First, plaintiffs must establish the intent to discriminate on the basis of political affiliation. Then, discriminatory effect
must be established, and EG can be used to that end. And finally, defendants must fail to provide justification of the necessity
of the plan on other legitimate legislative grounds.
10To use EG, we’d want a state with enough congressional districts for EG to be sufficiently granular, a close enough
overall partisan preference split that double-proportionality does not predict outlandish seat margins, few enough uncontested
districts to require a minimum of counterfactual speculation in incorporating them in to the numbers, an appropriate balance
of competitive districts to pass sensitivity analysis, and an egregious enough partisan power grab to still show up.
11One such example is Extreme Maps, a research report put out by the Brennan Center at NYU, which uses EG without
any caveats to assess the current state of partisan gerrymandering in the U.S.
12See for instance multiple papers with various co-authors by Jowei Chen and by Jonathan Mattingly, whose teams use
Markov chain Monte Carlo, or by Wendy Cho, whose team uses genetic and evolutionary algorithms.
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requirements and preferences. The core idea of EG can be coded into a simulation analysis by, for instance,
replacing the use of τ − 12σ as a score with bounds that constrain the deviation from proportionality rather
than prescribing it. Even better, the seats-to-votes proportionality could be used as an evaluation axis. A
plan like the Wisconsin legislative map could be taken as input, and hundreds of thousands of alternate
maps would be randomly generated that meet the relevant legal requirements and are scored at least as well
by legitimate districting criteria. If a districting plan had a seat share to vote share ratio of (S
A/S)/(TA/T ) =
1.25 in a particular election and 95% of computer-generated alternatives had ratios of 1.05–1.15 with the
same data, then we’d have excellent evidence of excessive partisan skew. Use of simulation comparisons
is improving quickly as increased computing power lets the algorithms visit more of the space of possible
plans. As the generation of random alternative maps rapidly becomes both sophisticated and practicable,
the hoped-for breakthrough in adjudicating gerrymanders, partisan and otherwise, may be coming within
close reach after all.
The Wisconsin plaintiffs are not asking the court to enshrine EG as the one true measure of partisan
gerrymandering, but only to accept it as a starting point in building a test to show when entrenched partisan
advantage has risen to the level of vote dilution of political opponents. We hope that the Supreme Court
agrees with them in a decision that leaves room for EG to pave the way for refined metrics and methods in
the years to come.
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